The release of the book Informational War: the pattern of aggression of the Russian Federation

The Center of Conflict Prevention and Early Warning in Bucharest, together with the Institute for Public Policies and the Information and Documentation Center of NATO in Republic of Moldova organized on Friday, 26th of August, at 11:00, at the Information and Documentation Centre of NATO in Moldova, the launch of the book: Informational War: the pattern of aggression of the Russian Federation, authors who are Mr. prof. Iulian CHIFU Mr. Oazu NANTOI and the others co-authors from Romania and the Republic of Moldova.
The main goal of the study to achieve the typing of informational War of Russia, to create a system of thresholds and levels of influence that would be referential assessing the impact of Russia’s informational war in a third country, and, the right to reveal the work in information warfare systems and awareness of the existence of this war and the protection of individual institutional formulas in the informational war.
In order to achieve a typification Russian informational war, we proceeded based on two complementary realities. First of all we considered Moldova, where the penetration of public space is total and the access level of penetration came to the political space, control of political forces – the most important party – which promotes the interests of the Russian Federation, here the study aimed directly visible elements of informational war, where letter carriers are makers themselves, politicians and opinion formers in the media space, the majority of the content produced directly from Moscow, some of the content held in Chisinau.
For the second component, that contained “under the radar”, we used the case of Romania, where deep reluctance to everything that comes from the Russian Federation policy, information, motivations is the major. In this context, informational war action of the Russian Federation in Romania must adopt alternatives that are more insidious and less visible, not to generate negative strong reactions. Therefore here is manifested the components of war trolls of psychological operations, conditioning elements and especially here at this stage of recruitment actions runs and provisioning of influence groups, support groups, mass recruitment maneuver and especially “persuaded.”
In both cases we studied public space and public events nowise we have not followed traceability action. It is for the other institutions of the states involved to leave their comments and identify ‘Smoking gun’, ie it proven the connection between the Russian authorities – directly to the service through some alleged NGOs or through embassy – and those who wear this action of informational war. The project aims only to identify ways of working, tools and informational war goals, noway the circuit identification of money and orders for action.
Leaving the two components, studied in distinctive media, where is the most important manifestation, we managed to achieve this typification of Russian informational war. Also we have managed to a system of thresholds and levels of influence that we propose as a reference of assessing the impact of Russia’s informational war in a third country. Thus, we have defined six levels, from level 0 which includes the normal, natural right of news in an open space, on freedom of the press and the Internet, with the goal of informing the public properly, with free circulation of ideas, at various levels of influence, knowledge, control up to level 5, determining strategic decision in a particular space.
Under this scale, at first sight, from studies made, Romania would be at level 1, Republic of Moldova would be at level 4, but with the possibility of slipping further, at level 5 in the future, if the Presidency and the majority are taken over by pro-Russian parties.
We also believe that the most important part of the project is to work in The disclosure of informational war systems and awareness of the existence of this war and institutional formulas and individual of protection in the the informational war. Furthermore, the project exposes the public and any internet user or genuine commentator on sites with dangerous news which can expose and how it can be used or recruited in the informational war.
The study also makes recommendations to counter informational war, ranging from operational measures, prompt – establishment of a commission to deal with interdepartmental informational war and countermeasures strategy, and going to medium and long-term measures, related to education, training and presentation of the different episodes of the informational war to the public to create the necessary antibodies of the takeover and discerning information publicly circulated, including in cyberspace.

Iulian Chifu, Oazu Nantoi

Disclaimer
Level 1: influence on public space is reduced, even if subject to the informational war. Access is at war trolls, intended to mark the presence of the pro-Russian or contesting in the comments, and the presence of favorable news and comments of Russia, but public space is balanced. It accrual support groups and lobbyists and influence.
Level 4: trong pro-Russian running in public. Major influence in the political space. Ability to influence and alter decisions. Pro-Russian party that defends the interests of the Russian Federation. Opinion leaders and political parties other than the pro-Russian positions defending Moscow.